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This study assesses the water use rights (WUR) system in 
Zhangye City, Gansu Province, Northwest China. The 
research was carried out to see how well the system 
performs, in terms of its impact on water conservation and 
redistribution, and to see what barriers stand in the way of 
its successful implementation. 
Under the WUR system, every water user gets a water 
quota fixed by the government. WURs can be sold, 
temporarily or permanently. The system was set up because 
Zhangye City is severely short of water. It is located in one 
of the driest area in the world and is mainly watered by the 
Heihe River. Almost all the water from the Heihe is 
currently extracted for irrigation and this has caused 
widespread desertification. 
The study finds that the WUR system is encountering 
significant problems. Farmers ignore their groundwater 
quotas and this is causing the region’s aquifer to empty. 
The study also finds that water quota trades are still few 
and far between. There are many reasons for this failure, 
but a key issue is the financial insecurity of the region’s 
farmers. There are also problems with the system itself, 
which encourages a “use it or lose it” attitude toward water 
consumption. The study concludes that water use quotas 
and trading in China must go hand in hand with social and 
administrative improvements if it is to succeed.  
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BARRIERS TO WATER MARKETS  




Tradable water rights systems are becoming an important way to achieve 
distributive efficiency for water resources. However, it is not easy for countries or 
regions to set up the system and water markets due to the existence of various barriers. 
In early 2002, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) of China initiated an 
experimental project to establish a water-saving society in Zhangye city in the Heihe 
river basin in north-west China – this project was the first of its kind in China. The aim 
of the project was to establish a new water use rights (WUR) system with tradable water 
quotas and to reallocate water resources reasonably and efficiently through market-
based instruments. This report presents the research done on the system and water 
markets. It has been found that that the system is hard to implement well and that WUR 
trading is not popular. The barriers to implementing a WUR system are social and 
administrative in nature. Local farmers cannot be forced to limit their water use because 
they cannot endure losses caused by water shortage. Local water agencies have no 
incentive to restrain local farmers from using excessive water. On the other hand, WUR 
trading faces management, legal, administrative, and fiscal barriers. There are 
management risks for farmers in switching to low water-intensive crops. It is also 
difficult for water buyers to buy rights to land and water use from farmers with small 
parcels. Farmers are discouraged from selling water to the government whom they fear 
will reduce their water quotas, and divert irrigation water to other sectors. This report 
gives some policy recommendations to overcome these barriers. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Governments control the water supply in many countries. These countries 
typically do not allocate water on the basis of economic efficiency but on other criteria. 
Fairness or equity may be a guiding principle. The price charged to agricultural users 
typically does not reflect the marginal costs of supplying water to them. Agricultural 
water is subsidized by governmental programs to support agriculture. Water use in 
agriculture is often inefficient and generates adverse environmental effects. 
Governments who have recognized these problems are slowly adjusting water prices 
and allowing some limited markets to operate (Hartwick and Olewiler 1998). The 
tradable water rights system has become a main path to market operations (Rosegrant 
and Binswanger 1994). Chile and the western United States are two places where water 
marketing is currently most advanced. The Chilean Water Law of 1981 established the 
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basic characteristic of property rights over water as proportional share; changes in the 
allocation of water within and between sectors are realized through markets in tradable 
water rights (Schleyer and Rosegrant 1996; Hearne and Easter 1995). To date, water 
marketing has largely involved transfers from relatively low-value, inefficient irrigation 
canals to municipal and industrial users.   
However, it is not easy for countries or regions to set up water rights trading 
markets due to many kinds of barriers: political, legal, administrative, cultural, 
psychological, technical and geographical. (Bauer 1997; Thobani 1997; Frederick 
2002). In the 1970’s and early 1980’s, several researchers noted barriers to market-
determined water transfers (Tregarthen 1983). Randall (1981) identified the threat of 
monopoly or foreign ownership, a perceived loss of subsidies, and the eventual closure 
of water channels (as a result of regional market transfers) as sources likely to impede 
market acceptance. Gaffney (1997) identified four impediments to functioning water 
markets in the United States. These included (1) a lack of seller motivation and market 
distortions exacerbated by hoarding behavior; (2) licensees withholding entitlements for 
fear of creating a public perception of surplus entitlements; (3) institutional 
inconsistencies in the treatment of groundwater, and differential levels and transparency 
of subsidies; and (4) the divesting of public property to the private sector to enhance 
market activity and encourage rent-seeking behavior. Bauer (1997) identified four 
obstacles in the development of water markets in Chile: (1) geographic and 
infrastructure constraints; (2) legal and administrative restrictions resulting from the 
failure to identify and quantify unused or non-activated entitlements, and ill-defined 
rights; (3) cultural and psychological attitudes regarding the importance of irrigation as 
a symbol of national endeavor, willpower, and overcoming hardship and (4) an 
ingrained skepticism of market processes, prices, and value obstacles because price 
signals remain uncertain, ambiguous, or contradictory.  Tisdell and Ward (2003) 
explored farmer responses to the introduction of water markets in the Goulburn-Broken 
Catchment of Victoria, Australia, and suggested that optimal market-based redistribution 
of water may not occur unless the social and cultural attitudes to trade are duly 
considered. Although the Chilean Water Law of 1981 has recently been touted as a 
model for other countries to follow, up to now, water rights sales separate from land are 
limited in Chile. The lesson that we can draw from the Chilean case is that while some 
barriers might be overcome by changes in law and policy, or by increasing water 
scarcity over time, others are unavoidable. The fact that empirical results are mixed (for 
example, price signals are confusing or contradictory) suggests that the Chilean model 
is something for other countries and regions to learn from rather than imitate (Bauer 
1997). 
Water resources are severely in short supply in China, especially in the north-
west. According to the Chinese Water Laws of 1988 and 2002, all water resources are 
state-owned – private ownership is banned. The Government, which represents the state 
as owner, allocates water resources to water users through governmental orders and 
water quotas. In early 2002, the Ministry of Water Resources initiated an experimental 
project in establishing a water-saving society in Zhangye city in north-west China – the 
first project of its kind in the country. The aim of the project was to establish a new 
water use rights (WUR) system with tradable water quotas and to reallocate and use 
water resources reasonably and efficiently through market-based instruments. However, 
it was found that the system was hard to implement effectively and that WUR trading 
was not popular (MWR 2004). The problem is establishing what kinds of barriers 
caused this and how they operate.   
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The research presented in this article explores the barriers to water markets in 
the Heihe river basin in north-west China and examines ways to overcome these 
barriers. This research is limited to agricultural water use and its transfer to other 
sectors. The following section introduces the study area for the experimental project. 
Section 3 presents the research methodology while Section 4 identifies and analyses the 
barriers. The last section gives the conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
2. THE STUDY AREA 
2.1 Zhangye City 
The Heihe River, the second longest inland river in China, originates from the 
Qilianshan Mountain which lies mainly in the Qinhai province and ends in Juyanhai 
Lake in Inner Mongolia. The study area is Zhangye city of Gansu province, which is 
located somewhere midstream of the Heihe River. According to the Statistics Bureau of 
Zhangye City (SBZC 2003), the city is 42,000 km2 in size and governs six counties; 
Ganzhou, Shandan, Minle, Gaotai, Linze and Sunan Yugur. The city currently has a 
population of 1.264 million, including a rural population of 911,000 and an urban 
population of 353,000. The urbanization rate is 27.9%. The area of farmland is 260,000 
ha. 
Located in one of the driest zones in the world, Zhangye city is an oasis mainly 
watered by the Heihe River. The precipitation in the city is 89-283mm per year, while 
the evaporation is 1,700mm per year. The water sources of the Heihe river basin are 
mainly the snow-melted water from the Qilianshan Mountain which is perpetually 
covered by snow. There are 26 rivers in the basin. All the rivers originate from the north 
side of the Qilianshan Mountain. The total water volume is 2.65 billion m3, including 
2.475 billion m3 of surface water and 0.175 billion m3 of groundwater. So far, there are 
24 irrigation areas which are larger than 10,000 mu (667 ha), 43 small and middle-sized 
reservoirs, and 35 pool embankments with a total water capacity of 202 million m3. 
There are 814 main canals and branch canals, and 4,489 irrigation wells. The available 
irrigation area is 257,000 ha, including 212,000 ha of farmland and 41,000 ha of 
forestland and grassland. (All data from SBZC 2003) 
According to MWR (2004), Zhangye city is severely short in water resources 
even though it has used up almost all the water of the Heihe River. It has 9,937 cubic 
meters of water per hectare of farmland. This is only 29% of the average figure for 
China. Meanwhile, water use is not well managed. Firstly, water allocation is not in 
order. Agricultural water use accounts for about 95% of all water uses. Industrial and 
commercial (I&C) water demands are severely restricted and economic development is 
thus affected. Almost all the water of the Heihe River is extracted for irrigation use. As 
a result of too little water flowing into Juyanhai Lake, it dried out in 1992 and an area of 
200km2 around the lake became desert (MWR 2004). Currently, the desertification area 
is rapidly expanding and more and more families are losing their homeland. Secondly, 
water conflicts are severe. Arguments and fights over water use take place almost every 
year. In 2002, a fight for water between two villages occurred, causing four people to be 
killed and more than 30 wounded. Thirdly, water use efficiency is very low. Farmers 
continue to plant water-intensive crops and use old, inefficient irrigation methods, such 
as flood and furrow irrigation. Water use efficiency in the agriculture sector here is only 
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between 20-30 per cent, far lower than in developed countries which have an average 
water use efficiency of 70 percent. 
In Zhangye city, water demand is increasing due to the growing population and 
expanding economy, with variable water demands from different users, regions, and 
industry sectors. As the total water supply is hard to increase, water reallocation is a 
difficult and sensitive issue. If not fairly distributed, severe water conflicts will break 
out. What the local government can do is to induce farmers to adopt water-saving 
irrigation measures and then to transfer the water that is saved to I&C, ecological, or 
other water uses. 
  
2.2 The Experimental Project  
In 2002, the Chinese government, through the Ministry of Water Resources, 
began an experiment to try to find more efficient ways, such as market mechanisms, to 
encourage water-saving activities and to allocate water resources. The 2002 Water Law 
does not refer to whether the water quotas are transferable. Similar to the land tenure 
reform that was initiated in 1978 (Qu et al. 1995), it appears, therefore, that China could 
establish a water use rights (WUR) system and allow WUR transactions through a water 
market while ownership transactions of water resources would still be banned. In fact, 
market transactions of water had emerged in some regions although no WUR systems 
had yet been established in China before 2002 (Wu 2003). In fact, the experimental 
project in Zhangye city was a pilot attempt to establish a WUR system.  
The pilot project was set to save water through three main ways:  
1) The government invested extensive capital to build a water-saving irrigation 
system because local farmers could not afford it. 
2) The government invested and installed meters for water users (including 
irrigators), and tried to discourage farmers from wasting water by accurately 
metering and charging for irrigation water. 
3) A WUR system with tradable water quotas was established, which tried to 
reallocate water more reasonably and efficiently and raise water use efficiency 
through water quotas trading.  
The first and second measures were successful as the 2002 results showed that 
the amount of irrigation water used decreased to a certain extent. However, the WUR 
system has not yielded the expected results as WUR trading is not popular.  
In the project, every water user gets a water quota that is fixed by the 
government. Water quotas (from the Heihe River) are allocated proportionally to all 
water users based on their respective historical usage. In the agriculture sector, 
historically, the average irrigation water amount of per hectare for all farmland in 
Zhangye city is allocated according to the acreage of the farmland. In the I&C sector, 
the water quota of every water user is individually granted by the government also 
according to historical water usage. In fact, the process and method of distributing the 
water quotas is no different from before the experimental project. But the character of 
the water quotas have changed. The water quotas have become a kind of long-term 
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property right, the WUR, which are allowed to be freely traded in water markets by 
water users. WUR can be sold both temporarily and permanently. Farmers can divide 
their WUR from their land use rights. This means that the nexus between water and land 
has been broken. But the WUR are not bankable unless the water users have water 
storage facilities, such as reservoirs.  
In Zhangye city, there is a perfectly natural irrigation system. Water melts on 
snow-covered mountains and flows to rivers, then to reservoirs, main canals, and finally 
to farmlands. The process is ‘self-flowing’ due to the change in topography from 
highland to lowland. All reservoirs and main canals are state-owned or collective-
owned. As many water users, such as farmers, have no reservoirs, water agencies on 
behalf of the government are engaged to manage the irrigation systems and water 
quotas. Water users can get water according to their water quotas by paying water fees 
to the water agencies. They must completely utilize their water quotas or sell them. 
Otherwise, they will forfeit them. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In a water market, a water rights system underlying well-defined property rights 
must first be established and well implemented in order for water trade to work. In 
Zhangye city, a WUR system has been designed and promoted. Water trading would be 
difficult or even impossible if the WUR system is not well implemented. This study 
considers two different and independent processes, WUR system implementation and 
WUR trading, separately. The analysis on WUR trading is based on the proper 
implementation of the WUR system. The Hongshuihe irrigation area is one with a well-
implemented WUR system while other WUR systems have not been well implemented 
in most other areas of Zhangye city. 
In this case, the barriers to implementing a WUR system are first analyzed in the 
areas of Zhangye city with poorly implemented WUR systems. Then the barriers to 
water trading are analyzed in the Hongshuihe irrigation area based on the well-
implemented WUR system found there.  
 
3.1 Field Survey and Sources of Data 
Both primary and secondary data were used to achieve the study’s objectives.  
Primary data was gathered through questionnaire surveys in five selected irrigation 
areas. The respondents included farmer households and officials from selected villages. 
Based on the pre-survey from 15 May to 2 June 2004, the survey strategy and 
questionnaires were designed. Sixteen college students from Gansu Agricultural 
University who originated from Zhangye city were then hired to conduct the main 
questionnaire surveys through interviews with the respondents in July and August 2004. 
To provide the students with a firm understanding of the objectives of the study and 
survey instruments, a three-day training course was given. In addition, during the two-
month survey period, two telephones hotlines were made available to the students.  
The stratified random sampling method was used to choose respondents for data 
collection. The samples of respondents for the survey were drawn randomly from the 
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updated lists that were prepared for the stratified sampling. In Zhangye city, there are 
about 25 main irrigation areas and 200,000 farmer households. The Hongshuihe 
irrigation area was primarily selected based on the pre-survey due to its good WUR 
system. Four other irrigation areas were selected randomly. In the Hongshuihe irrigation 
area, there are about 78 villages, 1,800 farmer households, and 268 local water agency 
officials. Forty villages were selected and from each, 10 farmer households were 
selected. There was a total of 400 farmer-respondents interviewed for this study, 380 of 
which had completed survey forms that were used in the analysis. At the same time, 100 
water agency officials were selected within the irrigation area of which 95 interviews 
were utilized. In each of the four other irrigation areas, 10 villages were selected, and 
from each, 10 farmer households. The total farmer respondents was 400 with 388, 
having completed forms. At the same time, 200 officials from the local water agencies 
within the four irrigation areas were selected of which 191 were used in the analysis. 
 
3.2 Questionnaire Design and Pre-Survey 
The questionnaire had three sections. Section 1 sought information on the 
characteristics of the irrigation areas and farmer households, such as the water quotas, 
actual water uses, farmland areas, crops, income, and labor of farmer households. 
Section 2 combined single- and multiple-response questions and open-ended questions 
to elicit the opinions of the farmers and local officials on the WUR system and WUR 
trading, such as their attitudes towards these and whether they were willing to accept the 
system. Section 3 used a 5-point Likert scale (1 for ‘strongly agree’ and 5 for 
‘completely disagree’) to check which of the possible barriers were perceived as true 
barriers by local farmers and officials. The possible barriers were determined through a 
pre-survey.  
The pre-survey was conducted through the use of in-depth, in-person interviews. 
The interviewees, both in local study areas and at national level, included 26 local 
farmers, 7 water experts, and 18 officials of various levels in the government. An 
interview guide was developed and used to ensure that the interviews were systematic 
and focused enough to cover relevant and comparable information. The questions were 
open-ended, focusing on the barriers identified in the literature review. By analyzing the 
data from the pre-survey, the possible barriers in Zhangye city were preliminarily 
identified. 
The possible barriers to the implementation of the WUR system were identified 
as: (1) geographical and technical barriers: it is difficult to divide and measure water (2) 
historical and cultural barriers: local farmers psychologically reject the establishment of 
a WUR system due to their customs and culture, (3) social barriers: local farmers cannot 
be forced to limit their water uses and endure the loss caused by water shortage, and 
finally, (4) administrative barriers: local water authorities have no incentive to restrain 
local farmers from over-using water.  
The possible barriers to the WUR trading were identified as: (1) geographical 
and technical barriers: it is difficult to divide and measure water (2) cultural barriers: 
local farmers treat water rights essentially as family property that they are by no means 
willing to sell (3) management barriers: there is a risk to farmers in increasing areas 
devoted to low water-intensive crops, (4) legal barriers: it is difficult to buy use rights to 
land and water from small farmers with small parcels (5) administrative barriers: the 
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government may reduce the farmers’ water quotas and transfer irrigation water to other 
sectors, and finally (6) fiscal barriers: the government is not willing to buy the surplus 
water of farmers when farmers fail to sell their surplus water in markets. 
   
3.3 Data Analysis 
Based on the 5-point Likert scale survey, the mean values were used to examine 
whether the possible barriers obtained in the pre-survey were supported by data 
obtained from the large survey of farmers and other respondents. A possible barrier was 
considered to have a significant role if it took a rank mean value of less than 3. The 
level of significance was tested at probability levels of 5% and 1% using the t-test of 
statistical significance. The differences in the responses of farmers and officials were 
assessed using the Mann-Whitney U-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The validity of 
these barriers was further assessed based on a review of literature on water trading 
practices elsewhere in the world. 
  
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Barriers to WUR System Implementation 
The initial approval and distribution of WUR was given and carried out by the 
government authorities in Zhangye city. According to the WUR system, every water 
user obtains his/her explicit and exclusive annual water quota. In the WUR system, 
surface water and groundwater are integrated for allocation to water users. Of the farmer 
respondents to the survey, 97.5% knew the system and their own water quotas. 
However, in the practical implementation of the WUR system, groundwater quotas are 
almost totally ignored and only surface water quotas are faithfully adhered to by 
irrigators (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Adherence to water quotas in five irrigation areas in Zhangye City 
% of households whose actual water use is 






quota to total 
water quota Total water Surface 
water 
Groundwater 
Hongshuihe 4.1 2.6 0.8 23.8 
Daman 35.0 78.1 1.7 98.1 
Liyuanhe 24.2 37.6 1.2 87.3 
Maying 21.3 23.7 0.9 67.5 
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Luotuocheng 83.8 76.4 1.3 81.7 
Source: field survey 
  
In the Hongshuihe irrigation area in Minle County where irrigation water mainly 
comes from a small-sized reservoir, Shuangshusi reservoir, and groundwater is very 
scarce and deep, water quotas are adhered to and the WUR system is well implemented. 
In the four other irrigation areas, where irrigation water comes from surface and ground 
water, besides adhering to surface water quotas, the users can still withdraw 
groundwater without considering their groundwater quota limits.  
The design of the WUR system is such that the government reduces the water 
quotas of farmers gradually (see Table 2) in order to transfer irrigation water to I&C and 
ecological uses. However, the farmers do not reduce the amounts of their actual water 
use in order to maintain their income level and production practices. They just reduce 
the amount of their surface water utilization but increase their groundwater use. Figures 
1 and 2 show the increase in the average number and depth of irrigation wells in the 
sample villages over the last few decades. Nowadays, the aquifer (an underground layer 
of porous rock, sand, etc. containing water into which wells can be sunk) is rapidly 
decreasing at a speed of 0.05-0.10m per year in Zhangye City (Chen 1999). Oases are 
shrinking and wells are drying up. Obviously, the WUR system will not work well and 
the aims of the experimental project will not be achieved unless groundwater quotas are 
strictly adhered to. 
Table 2. Water quotas for farmlands in Zhangye City 
Year 2000 2004 2010 
Average (m3/mu) 820 676 643 
Ganzhou District (m3/mu) 847 706 668 
Linze County (m3/mu) 788 648 620 
Gaotai County(m3/mu) 809 651 621 












1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
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Fig 2. The average depth of irrigation wells in the sample villages (1970 –2004) 
 
Table 3 summarizes the survey findings on which of the possible barriers are 
considered the major barriers in practice in Zhangye City. On the whole, the results of 
the survey suggest that social and administrative barriers are the main barriers rather 
than geographical, technical, historical or cultural barriers. Although the same results 
are gained from the responses of farmers and officials, there are differences between 
them according to the Mann-Whitney U-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  
 
Table 3. Opinion of farmers and officials as to possible barriers to WUR system 
implementation 
Mean Rank Response Barriers 
 Mean Farmers Officials 
MW-U KS-Z 
(1) Geographical and technical 4.2b,d 4.28 4.04 31564d 1.174 
(2) Historical and cultural 4.45b,d 4.52 4.32 32012.5d 1.349 
(3) Social 1.59a,d 1.68 1.42 117561.5d 1.349 
(4) Administrative 1.93a,d 1.8 2.21 27712d 2.008d
Source: field survey 
Notes: Scale: 1, strongly agree; 5, strongly disagree. MW-U represents the Mann-Whitney U-test.   
KS-Z represents the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
a significantly less than 3. 
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b significantly greater than 3. 
c significant at p<.05. 
d significant at p<.01. 
Although the mean rank responses of both officials and farmers convincingly 
indicate that social and administrative barriers exists, their ranking of which one is more 
important varies between the Mann-Whitney U-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
Farmers think that administrative barriers are more serious while officials consider 
social barriers as the real hindrances. Based on further survey and interviews with local 
officials, experts, and farmers, the specific reasons as to why various barriers exist or do 
not exist are as follows:  
1) There are no geographical and technical barriers because good water engineering 
and infrastructure enables the convenient redistribution of water to almost all 
water users. Snow-packs provide natural water storage. Snow begins to melt in 
spring and continues till early autumn through most of the irrigation season. To 
date, a reservoir has been built upstream of almost every main river.  Canal 
systems with permanent concrete structures have been built to connect these 
reservoirs with water users. Through the use of natural storage and well-
constructed reservoir-and-canal systems, water can easily flow to water users 
due to the down-slope. At the same time, there are effective and cheap metering 
techniques to measure water volume. For surface water, locals can meter the 
volumes of irrigation water according to the section size of canals and the water 
flow speed; as for groundwater, they can do so by taking into account conditions 
of the well and the amount of electricity used. (Every well has an electrical 
power pump connected to a meter.) 
2) Historical and cultural barriers do not exist because there is a long history and 
culture of allocating water by quotas. A water quota system was initiated in 1726 
(Shen and He 2004). Since then, water quotas have been regulated and 
controlled by the government and the system has worked for several hundreds of 
years. Of the farmer respondents in the survey, 96.8% welcome the WUR 
system if the government does not reduce their water quotas, and 87.2% think 
that the WUR system is similar to the old water quota system.  
3) Social barriers exist as farmers in Zhangye City are still poor and are naturally 
concerned about their income from their farmlands. According to the survey, the 
annual average income per farmer is only CNY 2983. The income of local 
farmers from agriculture accounts for just 35.60% of their total income. 
Nowadays, many farmers do non-agricultural jobs during their spare time so 
much so their income from agriculture is no longer their major source of income. 
However, 75.2% of the farmer respondents consider their income from 
agriculture as still very important to them. There are two reasons. Firstly, there is 
no social security system for farmers in most areas in China. Farmers have no 
security such as pension, new job opportunities, and medicine. Secondly, the 
farmers’ non-agricultural jobs are not fixed and lack security; by contrast, their 
income from agriculture is relatively secure. The farmers, therefore, think that 
their income from agriculture is a necessity for them to survive while non-
agriculture derived income is just extra cash to be able to live better. So, most 
farmers panic when they fail to get sufficient irrigation water. Of the farmer 
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respondents, 98.7% are not willing to adhere to water quotas if they do not get 
enough water for their crops. In such a case, officials are concerned that 
monitoring and simply constraining farmers’ irrigation water use will lead to 
many social issues, such as conflicts and disturbances. In fact, many conflicts 
have already occurred.  
4) Administrative barriers exist due to the fact that local levels of government and 
their water agencies are charging for the administration and management of 
water use, and have no incentive to force farmers to adhere to groundwater 
quotas. Groundwater use has severe negative externalities. For instance, the 
groundwater use in areas, such as Ganzhou district and Linze county, resulted in 
Minle county having the fastest drop in aquifer although Minle county used the 
least groundwater – many wells dried out and wetlands disappeared (Chen 
1999).  
According to the WUR system, water agencies should encourage farmers to save 
their water quotas in order to achieve water saving. On the contrary, however, 
these agencies usually force farmers to use up all their water quotas. From an 
institutional perspective, these agencies are non-profit organizations that should 
be financed by the government. But in practice, due to local government budget 
constraints, all the expenses, including salaries, of the agencies depend on the 
water fees charged. So the more water the farmers use, the more water fees they 
get. 
   
4.2 Barriers to WUR Trading 
Since the experimental project in 2002, WUR have become tradable. The field 
survey could not find WUR trading in most places except for the Hongshuihe irrigation 
area in Minle County. This is understandable because the WUR system has been well 
implemented only in this particular irrigation area and WUR trade depends on the good 
implementation of a WUR system. Of the farmer respondents to the survey, 82.4% 
know that WUR are tradable. In 2003, there were 13 WUR trades in the Hongshuihe 
irrigation area (see Table 4). This indicates that water trades are still few – all trades 
occurred between farmers within the agriculture sector. The water trades with land are 
greater in number and scale than those arising from surplus or saved water. Water trades 
with land are long-term, usually for several years, while those arising from surplus or 
saved water tend to be short-term trades for water quotas within the current year.   








% of the 
total water 
trade 











98.4 2.59 487.5 
Short-term 
trade 
5 615 CNY0.2  
/m3
1.6 0.04 123 
 11
Total 13 39615  100 2.63 3047 
Source: field survey. 
Note: The water quota per ha of land is about 6,000 m3. It is hard to separate the prices of land and water. 
In theory, the price of water rights should be equivalent to the difference between irrigated land and non-
irrigated land. In the Hongshuihe irrigation area, the output of irrigated land is about 10 to 20 times that of 
non-irrigated land.  
Table 5 summarizes the survey findings on the possible barriers existing in the 
Hongshuihe irrigation area. On the whole, the results of the survey suggest that 
management, legal, administrative and fiscal barriers are the main barriers rather than 
geographical, technical, and cultural barriers. According to the Mann-Whitney U-test 
and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, farmers consider management, legal, administrative and 
fiscal barriers as more serious obstacles to trading than officials regard them to be.  
Table 5. Opinions of farmers and officials as to possible barriers to WUR trading    
Mean Rank Response Barriers 
Mean Farmers Officials 
MW-U KS-Z 
(1) Geographical and technical 4.34b,d 4.34 3.99 15802c 1.193 
(2) Cultural 3.99b,d 3.99 4.02 17594 0.177 
(3) Management 1.62a,d 1.48 2.18 10132.5d 3.51d
(4) Legal 1.65a,d 1.61 1.79 88294c 0.734 
(5) Administrative 1.53a,d 1.41 2.03 83690d 2.753d
(6) Fiscal 1.59a,d 1.49 1.97 12678d 1.950d
Source: field survey 
Note: Scale: 1, strongly agree; 5, strongly disagree. MW-U represents Mann-Whitney U-test.  
KS-Z represents Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
a significantly less than 3. 
b significantly greater than 3. 
c significant at p<.05. 
d significant at p<.01. 
 
Based on further surveys and interviews with local officials, experts, and 
farmers, the reasons for the results are given as follows: 
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1) There are no geographical and technical barriers because good water engineering 
and infrastructure enables the convenient redistribution of water to almost all 
water users. The good conditions have been described above (see pg 10). 
2) Cultural barriers also do not exist. Since the foundation of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949, farmers no longer have ownership of land and water. They 
have been eligible only for tradable use rights to land and water since 1978 and 
2002, respectively. Most farmers do not think the land and water use rights are 
necessary and essential property rights. There are two major reasons. Firstly, 
they think that use rights are unstable and not legally secure, and worry that 
governments might withdraw them at any moment. Secondly, as the land and 
water owned by a farmer household is too small in size to support the farmer’s 
whole family, most farmers have to migrate to look for non-agriculture based 
jobs if they want to improve their lives. Of the farmer respondents to the survey, 
71.2% are willing to sell their land and water use rights and migrate, while 6.6% 
do not even care about the price or are willing to abandon their rights.       
3) Management barriers exist. According to Dai (1999), some modern irrigation 
technologies, such as sprinkle and drop irrigation technologies are not 
economically feasible in the arid area in northwest China. The most feasible 
water-saving practices are substituting furrow irrigation for flood irrigation, and 
substituting less water-intensive cash crops for water-intensive cereal 
production. In fact, enlarging alfalfa farmlands, especially with furrow irrigation 
technology, would be a good way for farmers to save water and then sell it. 
Local governments are now promoting this practice. But the expansion of alfalfa 
is taking place very slowly. Why? Of the farmer respondents to the survey, 
92.4% worry about the risk of enlarging alfalfa farmlands and prefer to plant 
wheat and corn while only 12.6% think that the income from planting alfalfa is 
lower than that of planting cereal crops. The perceived risks associated with 
enlarging alfalfa farmlands include the fear that there may not be enough buyers 
of alfalfa and that farmers may face a low price due to the absence of a floor 
price policy for this crop, which exists for cereals. China’s central government 
set up a floor price policy and subsidy policy for grain production in order to 
encourage farmers to plant grain to ensure food security. For cash crops, 
including alfalfa, there is no similar policy.  
4) Legal barriers have their roots in the Land Administration Law of China which 
states that farmlands owned by farmer organizations (collective organizations of 
all farmers in a village, usually in an administrative village) should be leased to 
every farmer household equally and fairly not only in quantity but also in 
quality. In order to guarantee absolute equity in quality, every parcel of land that 
is thought to have a different quality from another parcel must be segmented and 
allocated to every household at one time. For example, if a village has ten lots of 
land, a household would get ten little parts from them respectively instead of a 
big part from any one of them. In this case, farmers would have small but many 
farmland parcels. According to the survey, the average total area of farmland per 
household is 1.22ha, and the average number of farmland parcels of every 
household is 10.13, meaning that the average area of every parcel is only 0.12ha. 
In such a case, it is very difficult for a farmer who wants to buy land and water 
use rights to achieve scale economies because he/she has to negotiate with many 
farmers at the same time. Of the farmer respondents to the survey, 71.2% are 
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willing to sell their land and water use rights and 65.3% are willing to buy land 
and water use rights and achieve economies of scale. 71.2% plus 65.3% is more 
than 100% – this means that some farmers are open to the possibility of either 
buying the rights to enlarge their agricultural holdings or selling their rights and 
quitting agriculture altogether.  
5) Administrative barriers also exist. Reducing water quotas (see Table 2) will 
gradually leave farmers with no surplus water to sell. Of the farmer respondents 
to the survey, 98.6% think that water is in shorter supply than before and that 
they have no surplus water to sell, making potential water buyers disappear. By 
reducing the farmers’ water quotas, local governments can increase the water 
quotas of users in non-agricultural sectors who need more water. Nowadays in 
China, most local governments pay strong attention to how they can get more 
investments from the outside. A local official1 said that the government would 
not let new I&C water users buy water quotas from water markets at the market 
price (a higher price than the water fee), in order to attract investors. He added 
that the government has reserved water quotas for future investors, the potential 
water buyers, according to its water use plan. Reducing the water quotas of 
farmers discourages them from saving water. Of the farmer respondents to the 
survey, 80.1% said that the policy of gradually reducing farmers’ water quotas 
gives rise to the worry that the government would further reduce their water 
quotas if they saved water and had surplus water to sell. 
6) Fiscal barriers arise when the farmers have no way to store the surplus or saved 
water, and it is hard for them to find buyers for surplus or saved water in the 
water market. Because of the lack of an efficient water market, users continue to 
lack motivation to save water if the “use it or lose it” doctrine is still maintained. 
Farmers usually just irrigate the surplus water to their farmlands. Thus, it would 
be a good alternative for the government to buy the surplus  water of farmers. It 
would encourage farmers to save water which would be bought by the 
government and stored in reservoirs or transferred to other uses, such as new 
I&C or ecological uses. In the draft of the “Guidelines for Agricultural Water 
Trading in Zhangye City” (Zhangye Municipal Government 2003), it was 
proposed that the government buy the water saved by farmers at a price of 120% 
of the water fee.2 But when the Guidelines were officially issued in 2003, this 
proposal had been taken out, the reason being that it was hard to obtain fiscal 
support for local authorities to buy the surplus water. So who should then pay 
the fee for ecological water use? This problem remains unsolved. 
  
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
                                                 
1 Personal communication with Mr. Luan Linmin, Director of Water Resources Office 
of Zhangye City Government, July 25, 2004. 
2 The water fee averages about CNY0.10 per m3. If the local authorities buy water at the 
price of CNY0.12 per m3, 
this could make farmers’ income increase by CNY0.02 per m3.  
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5.1 Conclusions 
The WUR system is not well implemented in most places in Zhangye city except 
for the Hongshuihe irrigation area where groundwater is scarce and deep. There is no 
WUR trading to be found in the irrigation areas where there are groundwater sources 
and the WUR system is not well implemented. Even in the Hongshuihe irrigation area 
where the WUR system is well implemented, WUR trading is scarce. This study 
analyzed the barriers of two different processes, the implementation of the WUR 
system, and WUR trading. It was found that the geographical, technical, historical and 
cultural barriers that exist in other countries (Bauer 1997; Gaffney 1997; Tisdell and 
Ward 2003) do not exist in Zhangye city.  It was also found that there are different 
barriers for the two processes.  
The barriers to WUR system implementation are social and administrative in 
nature. Local farmers cannot be forced to limit their water use as they cannot endure the 
loss caused by water shortage. Local water agencies have no incentive to restrain local 
farmers from using water, especially groundwater. As for WUR trading, the barriers 
faced are management, legal, administrative and fiscal related. There is a management 
risk for farmers in switching to low water-intensive crops. It is difficult for water buyers 
to buy rights to land and water use from farmers with small parcels. Farmers are 
discouraged from selling water to the government whom they fear will reduce their 
water quotas, and divert irrigation water to other sectors.  
 
5.2 Policy Recommendations 
The following policy recommendations are given to overcome the barriers to WUR 
system implementation and WUR trading:  
1) Set up a rural social security system to overcome the social barriers. According 
to the empirical findings, many farmers value their agricultural income but not 
their water and land use rights. At present, farmers have a strong dependence on 
water and land resources due to the lack of a good social security system. They 
need the stable income from agriculture or natural resources such as water and 
land for security. If they can gain better forms of social security, most of them 
would no longer value the income from agriculture as much as it would only be 
a smaller part of their total income and they would be better able to endure the 
losses arising from water shortage.  
2) Reform the water management institution and fix long-term farmers’ water 
quotas to overcome administrative barriers. Make the revenue of local 
governments and water agencies no longer dependent on local water usage. 
Create a policy to fix the revenue or reduce it when the local water use increases. 
Raise the revenue when local water use decreases. This could also reduce the 
effect of the negative externality of groundwater over-use. At the same time, the 
government should abandon the policy on reducing farmers’ water quotas 
gradually and transferring irrigation water to non-agricultural sectors. The 
farmers’ water quotas should be fixed for a long term, such as 30 to 50 years to 
stabilize the WUR of farmers. It should also allow and encourage farmers to 
transfer agricultural water to other water users via market-oriented channels 
instead of through government intervention. 
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3) Draw up policies to help farmers avoid the management risk of increasing low 
water-intensive crops. Increasing low water-intensive crops is a good way to 
save water but the farmers dare not take the risk of changing their cropping 
system. So the government could provide subsidies or eco-compensation to 
farmers who plant alfalfa, or set a floor price for alfalfa just like for cereal.  
4) Draw up policies to encourage farmers to enlarge the land area under their 
management. Since households get little parcels from all lots of land, they could 
be encouraged to concentrate on one parcel of land and aim to make it bigger by 
acquiring additional lands from other land owners. Some of them could even be 
encouraged to quit farming, thus releasing their water and land resources. At 
present and in the future, China should promote urbanization (Tian 2003). In 
Zhangye city, the urbanization rate is very low – many farmers will migrate 
from rural to urban areas if urbanization is further promoted (Zhangye City 
Municipal Government 2000). This would lead to many farmers surrendering 
their water and land resources and improve scale economies for remaining 
farmers, but how to make such a policy work needs further study.  
5) Establish a floor price policy for farmers’ surplus water to overcome the fiscal 
barriers. The government should no longer force farmers to use their surplus 
water. On the contrary, it should set aside a budget to buy farmers’ surplus or 
saved water at a floor price3 when the farmers fail to sell it in the market, just as 
what was originally proposed in the draft of the “Guidelines for Agricultural 
Water Trading in Zhangye City”. Through this policy, the doctrine of “use it or 





                                                 
3 It could be CNY0.12/m3 as mentioned earlier. It should be affordable for the 
government. Assuming that all the farmlands in the Hongshuihe irrigation area switch to 
planting alfalfa, it could save 28 million m3 of water, worth CNY3,361,680. This is just 
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